For countahlc·~tate decision processes (dynamic programming prohlems l, a general c1as~ of ohjecti\'e functions is identified for which it is ~hown that good Markov strategies always e~isl. This class includes product ,Ind lim inf rewards, as well as practically all the classical dynilmic programming C)(pccted payoff functions. dynamic programming" Milrkllv decision process" Markov strategy t. I nt rod uction This paper is organized as follows: Section :2 contains the preliminary definitions and averaging results; Section 3 contains the definition of product-reward dependent randomized Markov strategies, and their application in establishing the existence of good randomized Markov strategies in a large class of objective functions 1V; Section 4 establishes the existence of good non-randomized Markov strategies in '11"'; and Section 5 establishes the existence of good (non-randomized) Markov strategies for the expected lim inf reward criterion.
A fundamental question in the theory of decision processes is whether decision rules (strategies) which depend only on the current state or only on the current time and state yield as high rewards as strategies which take the whole past into account. For many types of objective functions such as average reward payofIs, the first type of strategy (called stationary) is often much inferior to more general strategies, whereas for most common objective functions the second type (called Markov strategies) have been found to be as good as general strategies (cf. [I, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10, II, 13, 14, 17, 21] ).
The main purpose of this paper is to prove the existence of good Markov strategies for a large class of objective functions which includes product and lim inf payoffs as well as practically all of the classical dynamic programming expected payoff functions. One of the key new ideas is the use of a randomized Markov strategy which depends not only on a given non-randomized strategy, but on the (product) reward function as well, in contrast to the usual randomized Markov average which depends only on the original strategy (7, 8, II, 14, 19 ].
(T(X I , . •. ,x,,) = (T(X; • .•. ,x;") whenever x;" = X". The conditional strategy given XI' ... , X"' (F[X t , .•• , x,,], is defined by (T[X I , •• . , xn](x;, ... , x;,,) =(T(X" •. . ,X n , x;, . .. , x:,,).
X" denotes the state of the process at time n and can be regarded as the nth-coordinate projection map on X'x,. Thus X" is a random variable on the probability space (X""", Be"", (F) . In addition, S(x) denotes the Dirac delta measure at x, and fA the indicator function of the set A. Thus t ~ I: and in general the gambler has more strategies available in P than in I~ namely the "randomized averages" of his originally available strategies. One may think of constructing a strategy in t· by use of independent lotteries: when one is at state x, he may select the lottery (i.e. the {p;}) of his choice, and use that lottery to detcrmine which gamble in r(x) he selects (see the proof of Proposition 2.2).
Clearly I"(x) is convex for all x, and in general is strictly larger than the convex hull of rex).
The first proposition in this section says that every Markov strategy a in f may be expressed as an average (expected value) of Markov strategies in T. Aside from some notational differences, the proposition is similar to theorems of Krylov [14, Theorem 1] and Fainberg [7, Theorem 1] . Because of the changes in notation, a proof is provided here. Moreover, if a is a ~farkov strategy, then {O"w: WEn} can be chosen to be Markov.
Proof. The argument will be provided for the case where ais Markov; the demonstra tion in the non-Markov case is essentially the same. Fix a Markov strategy a in t at x. and without loss of generality let X ={I, 2, 3, ...}. Enlarging the underlying probability space if necessary, embed the "state process"
and Y, is independent of XI> ... , X,); and the conditional distribution of X, <I given In contrast to the conclusion of Proposition 2.2 pertaining to Markov strategies, it is not always possible to write a stationary strategy in j'as the average of stationary strategies in r Proposition 2.4. Let a be a strategy in f at x, and let I :X x--.!R be measluable and a-integrable (i.e. f II Ida < 00). Then there exist strategies a l and U~ in r at x with !vloreol'er, il a is Markov, then U 1 and Uz can be chosen to be Markov.
Proof. By Proposition 2.2 there is a probability space (f1, s1, J1.) and a collection of (Markov) strategies {u,J in r at x satisfying (2.1). It then follows routinely (for indicator functions, then for simple functions, then for limits of simple functions) using the dominated convergence theorem that Since jJ. is a prohability measure, this even implies there is a set of w of positive 
Equality is not always attainable In the conclusion of Proposition 2.4, as the following easy example shows. 
Randomized Markov strategies
Assume that (X, F) is a countable-state decision process. Definition 3.1. For each positive integer n, let r n be a non-negative real-valued function with domain X and let Y r be the collection of all strategies in r. Let "11' -1 be the set of all functions WI: Y r -+ [-00, +00] = iR which are of the form and let "11"2 be the set of all functions w:: Y r -+ [ -00, + 00] of the form
where g is any function having domain (iR+)-X:' and taking values in iR. Let "'W. u '11-: be denoted by "W".
Thus "11' 1 consists of those payoff functions which depend only on expected one-stage rewards, while "'W: includes those payoffs which depend on successive expected product rewards.
The following example lists some typical functions in 'W, both some standard dynamic programming objectives and several non-standard ones. Example 3.2. (a) total reward. Then WE "IV., where (In particular, if f3>O and r,,=f3 n -1 r, then w(u) is "total discounted reward"; if 'n =0 for n ~ N, w(u) is "total finite horizon reward",)
" (e) average periodic reward. Let p be a positive integer. Then WE "'WI, where (In particular, if p = I, then w(O") is "lim sup reward".)
Two objective functions which are not in 11' are the classical gambling-theoretic
for the case where r may take negative and positive values. The question of adequacy of Markov strategies for the gambling-theoretic payoff is answered aflirmatively, if X is finite. in Hill [10] ; for the product reward problem, Markov strategies arc not in general adequate (Example 3.7 below).
As preparation for the fundamental defInition of product-dependent randomized Markov strategy, some notation is needed. For each positive integer n, let r,,: X -Ill be a non-negative function and let IT be a strategy. If q = (x" X~, . .. ,x,,) is a sequence (or partial history) of length n in X, let ~«(T, q) denote the product
That is,
It is easy to see that Notice that the transition probability (gamble) that u uses at x" is a mixture of gambles that u uses at x", weighted with respect to the products ~(u, px"). The assumption that each 'j is non-negative guarantees that u( q) ~ O. In the case where ~(u, px,,) = 0 for each p E X"-t, the definition of u(q) is rather arbitrary; u(x,,) was chosen for convenience to ensure that u is Markov and in f.
Remark. In the special case where '" == 1 for each n, the strategy u in Definition 3.3 has the property that
for each subset G of X, each positive integer n, and each x E X. Such a randomized
Markov average u has been used often in the literature of dynamic programming.
(For example, see Fainberg [7, 8] , or Strauch [19]).
The product-dependent randomized Markov strategy u yields the same product reward as the original strategy u. as seen below: (3.4) qt:X"-1 C/t: .. ,\"-I Then, evaluating each side of the measure equality (3.4) at (X" = xn), multiplying both sides by," (x,,), and summing over all x" in X, the desired equality (3.2) will be obtained for alLn ~ 2.
To prove (3.4) for n = 2, observe that for each x in X, The following theorem, the main result in this section, guarantees the existence of good randomi::ed Markov strategies for all countable-state decision processes with objective function in cWo It will also serve as a stepping stone to Theorem 4.2, which asserts the existence of good non-randomi:ed Markov strategies for many of the objective functions in '1t·. Theorem 3.5. Let (X, r) he a cOlUltah/e-state decision process, and suppose IV E '11'.
Then for cac" x E X ami each rT in r at x. t"ere is a randomi:ed Markov .'itrate~y /; in t at x wit" w( (I-) ~ w( (T). I)roof. Let x E X and let (T he in r at x. In case WE 'U"" let CT be the randomized Markov strategy described in the remark following Definition 3.3. The relation (3.1) guarantees that EAr" ( X" )] = E" [ r" ( X" )] (3.5) for each II?: I, and hence that w(rF) = w(rT), proving the theorem. In case wE 'U·~, let CT be the product-dependent randomized Markov strategy for (T and r l , r~, r\, .... In Delinition 3.1, each function r" was assumed non-negative, and in the case where W E 'JV~, the proof of Theorem 3.5 did use this assumption. However, in the case where WE 'WI' the only purpose of the hypothesis r" ?: 0 was to guarantee the existence of each expectation E,,[ r,,( X,,)]. Thus for the 'WI case, the non-negativity assumption on r" may be weakened.
Actually, in the 'WI case, the proof of Theorem 3.5 depended only upon the fact that the distributions of X" under (T and (T are the same, and not upon the integrals in (3.5). Therefore its conclusion would hold for a much larger class than 'JV., specifically, objective functions which depend only on the distributions of the random variables, such as functions of the medians, supports, or variances. But for the application of this theorem in the proof of the existence of good non-randomized Markov strategies (Theorem 4.4), integration (via averages of probability measures and Fatou's Lemma) plays an important role.
The 'W t case of Theorem 3.5 could also be extended to reward functions of the form r"(X,,, X,,+I), since the distribution of (X", X" +I ) is the same under a as under the a described in (3.1). Even further, the reward could depend on the gamble or action as well. with rewards of the form r"(X", ' Y, X"+t). Such reward functions have been investigated before (cf. Ornstein [15] or Schal and Sudderth [18] ).
This section concludes with three examples of decision processes where the payoff functions are not in ,:OW, and where, in contrast to the setting of Theorem 3.5, there are non-Markov strategies in r which yield substantially larger payoffs than any
Markov strategies in f. In the first example, the payoff is the expected maximum reward over times 1,2, and 3 (recall the maximum expected reward 3.2(d) is in lV). In the second example, the payoff is the product of rewards over times 1,2. and 3, but negative rewards are allowed. The third example shows that it is not possible to extend Theorem 3.5 to include payon functions w which can be written as a sum of two payoffs, one from 11~t and one from W~. If the reward functions r tl are non-negative, then the expected product reward objective w lies in 'W (Example 3.2(f», and by Theorem 3.5, good randomized Markov strategies do exist. It follows from Theorem 4.2 in the next section that even good non-randomized Markov strategies exist for such an objective. Denardo and Rothblum [4] use linear programming to compute optimal policies for problems which have exponential utility functions and which satisfy certain transience conditions. In [12] and [13] , Kreps studies the existence of optimal (non-Markov) strategies in problems with finite action spaces and general objective functions and the existence of good strategies which are Markov or stationary with respect to certain attached "summary spaces". Furukawa and Iwamoto [9] prove the existence of e-optimal stationary strategies for decision problems which have multiplicative payoffs and which satisfy certain monotonicity and Lipschitz condi tions. The multiplicative payoff is also used by Rothblum in [16] .
As pointed out in [9] , the multiplicative payoff often arises naturally in problems where the objective is to maximize system reliability in a device with components 10 senes.
Existence of good Markov strategies in r
The previous section established that if the objective function w lies inU' then for any strategy there is a randomized Markov strategy with an equivalent payotI. In this section, Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 demonstrate that for a large class of objective functions within "If", it is even possible to find a f1on-randomized Markov strategy whose payotI is at least as good as the payolf for the original strategy. For those objective functions in 'JV which are in 'WI, the conclusions of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 arc similar to those of theorems of Fainberg [8, Section 4] . It is assumed throughout that (X, 1') is a countable-state decision process. Proof. Suppose (T A is in r at x and wE'll". By Theorem 3.5, there is a randomized Markov strategy a. in t at x with w(o.) = w(a A ). Using Proposition 2.4, there exists a Markov strategy lr,\, in r at x such that
The lr~, conclusion follows similarly. 0 It was shown earlier (Theorem 3.5) that if w::1'/, -+ IR is in 'Jr, then for any strategy a there is a randomi:ed Markov strategy 0with w(o-) = w(a). By imposing some convexity restrictions, the following key theorem is obtained, which asserts the existence of good non-randomized Markov strategies. (Of course, by enlarging the state space sufficiently, any problem can be transformed into one where even good "stationary" strategies always exist, but the essence of "stationary" and "Markov" for the original problem is lost under the transformation.) For each x E X, if sup{Gn(u): n~l and u is in rat x}<oo, then for any strategy u A in r at x there is a (non-randomized) Markov strategy UM in r at x such that Proof. Let (1'" be in r at x. By Theorem 3.5, there is a randomized Markov strategy u in t at x such that w(u) = W«(T A ). Apply Proposition 2.2 to obtain a family {(T..,) of Markov strategies in r at x such that for all n, Since JL is a probability measure, the relation above guarantees that there exists W (in fact, a set of w's of positive measure) with W(CT..,);:!= w(a) = W(CT A ).
0 For x E X, let W(x) = sup{ W(17): 17 is in r at x}. A strategy 17 Ao in r at x is optimal if W(17-\) = W(x); for e>O, 17 Ao is E-optimal if W(17 Ao ) > W(x)-e. The following corollary is immediate. Corollary 4.3. If the h.vpotheses of Theorem 4.2 are satisfied, then for each E > 0 and x E X, there is a Markov E-optimal strategy in rat x. If also there is an optimal strategy in r at x, then there exists a AJarkov optimal strategy in r at x.
Remarks. If one replaces "Iimsup" by "sup" in the definition of W in Theorem 4.2, the conclusion still holds; to see this, let h" = max j ", " gj' and observe that the h" are convex and that limsup h" = lim h" = sup g". Notice that g" is not convex, and that if (TA is a strategy in r at a which. satisfies aA(h, d) = Ii(e) and a,,(c, d) = 5(f), then w(17 A ) = 1. However, for any Markov strategy aM in r at a, E"" (X.\) = I or 0, so w( a,l\,) = O. (Of course, as Theorem 3.5 implies, there does exist a randomi:ed Markov strategy (T in P at a such that W«(T) = I.)
Practically no condition, including the convexity of the g" 's, is necessary for the conclusion of Theorem 4.2 to hold, as can be seen by looking at any decision process where r(x) has only one element for each x (so there is only one strategy, and that is even stationary) and an arbitrary payofI function.
Good Markov strategies for the lim inf objective
The results of the earlier sections will now be used to show that for the expected lim inf payon, it is possible to find Markov strategies which are nearly optimal.
In the classical gambler's problem of Dubins and Savage [6] , applied to the special case of a countable-state decision process, the payoff associated with a strategy is If the state space X is finite, the conclusion of Theorem 5.1 is a special case of a result of Hill [10] , who showed that if the functionj' in (4.1) is both shift-invariant and permutation-invariant, then good Markov strategies exist.
